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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Sharon Matthews appeals from the District Court's order 
affirming the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security 
of Matthews' application for disability insurance benefits 
(DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act.1 This case 
raises the important issue of the treatment to be given by 
the district court of evidence submitted by the claimant for 
the first time to the Appeals Council, which has then 
denied review. This is an issue on which the Courts of 
Appeals are divided. Some courts hold that such evidence 
should be considered by the district court in its review of 
the final decision of the Commissioner, see Perez v. Chater, 
77 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1996); O'Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 
855, 859 (10th Cir. 1994); Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 
1452 (9th Cir. 1993); Nelson v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 363, 366 
(8th Cir. 1992); Wilkins v. Sec'y of DHHS, 953 F.2d 93, 96 
(4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), whereas others hold that evidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Matthews also applied for supplemental security income (SSI) under 
Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Because the relevant regulations and 
statutory provisions of SSI track those of DIB, we will refer only to the 
former in the text. 
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not presented to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) should 
not be reviewed by the district court nor be the basis of a 
remand to the Commissioner unless the evidence is new 
and material and there is good cause for not having 
produced the evidence earlier, see Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 
1320, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124 
(1999); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-96 (6th Cir. 
1993); Eads v. Sec'y of DHHS, 983 F.2d 815, 817-18 (7th 
Cir. 1993). In this case, the District Court held that a 
claimant must demonstrate good cause for not having 
submitted new and material evidence to the ALJ. Appellant 
argues that the District Court erred as a matter of law in 
imposing the good cause requirement. The issue is one of 




Matthews applied for disability benefits on October 15, 
1992, alleging disability since December 9, 1991. She 
claimed hearing loss, arthritis, and right foot dr op 
stemming from an old Achilles tendon ruptur e. Her claim 
was denied initially and again on reconsideration. Matthews 
requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on 
September 21, 1994. The ALJ found that Matthews was not 
disabled and denied her claim. The Appeals Council 
granted Matthews' request for review. On r eview, it vacated 
the ALJ's decision and remanded for a new hearing. It 
directed the ALJ to give further consideration to Matthews' 
residual functional capacity during the entir e period at 
issue and to "[o]btain supplemental evidence from a 
vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed 
limitations on the claimant's occupational base." Tr. at 363. 
 
A different ALJ held a second hearing on July 11, 1996. 
At this hearing, Matthews testified, inter alia, of pain in her 
right foot, ankle, and knee, and she submitted medical 
reports in connection with these impair ments as well as of 
her hearing loss. Diana Simms, an impartial vocational 
expert, also testified at the hearing and stated there were a 
significant number of sedentary and unskilled jobs, such as 
cashier, that an individual with Matthews' impairments, 
age, educational background, and employment history 
could perform. Notably, the ALJ held the record open to 
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allow Matthews to include the final report of her treating 
physician before issuing the decision. 
 
The ALJ issued a decision on April 21, 1997, concluding 
that Matthews was not disabled. In the decision, the ALJ 
noted that none of Matthews' treating and examining 
physicians opined that she could not perfor m sedentary 
work. The ALJ found that medical evidence established that 
the claimant has severe residuals of an injury to her right 
leg and significant hearing loss, that these impairments do 
not meet or equal the criteria of the listed impair ments, 
that Matthews' testimony on the severity of her 
impairments was not credible inasmuch as she could use 
public transportation and engage in social activities without 
much difficulty, that Matthews is unable to per form any of 
her past relevant work as a teacher's aide or hospital 
worker, but that although she is unable to perform the full 
range of sedentary work, there are a significant number of 
jobs in the national economy that she can per form. The 
ALJ gave examples of sedentary, unskilled jobs in a low- 
noise environment that Matthews could per form, including 
work as a cashier in a small office. 
 
Matthews filed a request for review to the Appeals 
Council on June 23, 1997. On December 8, 1997, mor e 
than eight months after the ALJ's decision, Matthews 
submitted to the Appeals Council a two-page letter and 
accompanying documents from Richard Baine, a vocational 
expert, who stated that Matthews lacked the r equisite 
arithmetic and reading skills to work as a cashier. Baine 
also stated that Matthews' exertional and nonexertional 
impairments would preclude her fr om performing any other 
gainful work activities in the national economy. T r. at 386- 
87. 
 
On January 7, 1998, the Appeals Council denied 
Matthews' request for review. The Appeals Council noted 
that Social Security Administration regulations"provide 
that where new and material evidence is submitted with the 
request for review, the entire r ecord will be evaluated and 
review will be granted where the Appeals Council finds that 
the Administrative Law Judge's actions, findings, or 
conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence 
currently of record," App. at 34, citing 20 C.F.R. SS 404.970 
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and 416.1470. The Council's action stated that "the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision stands as thefinal 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security." App. at 
34. The Appeals Council then incorporated Baine's r eport 
into the administrative record. 
 
Matthews filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, r equesting judicial 
review of the Commissioner's final decision. The parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On September 
14, 1999, the Magistrate Judge to whom the District Court 
referred the matter recommended that the Commissioner's 
motion for summary judgment be granted because the 
ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The 
Magistrate Judge determined that Baine's r eport was new 
and material but should not be considered on judicial 
review because Matthews had failed to demonstrate good 
cause for failing to present the evidence to the ALJ. The 
District Court agreed that Matthews had not shown good 
cause for failure to present Baine's r eport to the ALJ, 
adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, and, 
following a discursive opinion discussing the evidence and 
the legal issues, granted summary judgment for the 
Commissioner. 
 
Matthews appealed to this court. She argues that the 
District Court erred in refusing to consider new evidence 
"which was presented to and consider ed by the 
Commissioner's Appeals Council as part of the 
administrative record under review" and that the court 
erred in applying a good cause requir ement "which does not 
exist in the regulations to new evidence which was 
submitted to and considered by the Commissioner's 
Appeals Council, which made it a part of the administrative 
record under review." Br. of Appellant at 1. Our standard of 
review over the legal question presented is plenary. See 




The question of law before us is whether the claimant 
must demonstrate good cause for failure to pr esent to the 
ALJ new and material evidence presented for thefirst time 
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to the Appeals Council which, after consideration, denies 
the review. 
 
The administrative review process is gover ned by Social 
Security Administration regulations. If a claimant's 
disability application is denied, s/he may r equest a 
reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. See 
20 C.F.R. S 404.900. If the claimant is dissatisfied with the 
reconsideration determination, s/he may r equest a hearing 
before an administrative law judge, wher e the claimant can 
present evidence of impairments. See id. If the claimant is 
dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, s/he may r equest the 
Appeals Council to review the decision. See id. The 
regulations permit the claimant to submit to the Appeals 
Council "new and material" evidence that r elates to the 
period on or before the date of the ALJ's hearing decision. 
See 20 C.F.R. S 404.970(b).2 The Appeals Council then must 
"evaluate the entire record including the new and material 
evidence submitted." Id. However, the submission of the 
new and material evidence does not requir e the Appeals 
Council to grant review. On the contrary, the r egulations 
provide that the Appeals Council will grant r eview only if it 
finds that the ALJ's decision "is contrary to the weight of 
the evidence currently of record." Id. 
 
Unlike the administrative process, which is governed by 
the regulations, the standards for judicial review are 
governed by the Social Security Act. A claimant who was 
unsuccessful in the administrative process may seek 
judicial review once there is a final decision by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The applicable subsection of the regulation provides in full: 
 
        (b) If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council 
       shall consider the additional evidence only wher e it relates to 
the 
       period on or before the date of the administrative law judge 
hearing 
       decision. The Appeals Council shall evaluate the entire record 
       including the new and material evidence submitted if it relates to 
       the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge 
       hearing decision. It will then review the case if it finds that the 
       administrative law judge's action, findings, or conclusion is 
contrary 
       to the weight of the evidence currently of r ecord. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 404.970(b). The applicable section of the SSI regulation is 
substantially the same. See 20 C.F.R.S 416.1470(b). 
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Commissioner of Social Security. See 42 U.S.C. S 405(g); 
see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976). If 
the Appeals Council denies the request for r eview, the ALJ's 
decision is the Commissioner's final decision. See Sims v. 
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000). 
 
The Act provides that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner 
of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial 
evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.S 405(g) (emphasis 
added). Sentence Four of S 405(g) provides that "[t]he court 
shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript 
of the record, a judgment affir ming, modifying, or reversing 
the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or 
without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
If the claimant proffers evidence in the district court that 
was not previously presented to the ALJ, then the district 
court may remand to the Commissioner but that 
disposition is governed by Sentence Six ofS 405(g). That 
sentence provides, 
 
       The court may, on motion of the Commissioner of 
       Social Security made for good cause shown befor e the 
       Commissioner files the Commissioner's answer , 
       remand the case to the Commissioner of Social 
       Security for further action by the Commissioner of 
       Social Security, and it may at any time or der additional 
       evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social 
       Security, but only upon a showing that there is new 
       evidence which is material and that there is good cause 
       for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the 
       record in a prior proceeding; and the Commissioner of 
       Social Security shall, after the case is remanded, and 
       after hearing such additional evidence if so or dered, 
       modify or affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact or 
       the Commissioner's decision, or both, and shallfile 
       with the court any such additional and modified 
       findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the 
       additional record and testimony upon which the 
       Commissioner's action in modifying or affir ming was 
       based. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, we have r ecognized that 
evidence first presented to the district court must not only 
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be new and material but also be supported by a 
demonstration by claimant of "good cause for not having 
incorporated the new evidence into the administrative 
record." Szubak v. Sec'y of HHS, 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
 
To summarize the options open to the district court, 
when the Appeals Council has denied review the district 
court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's 
decision, with or without a remand based on the record 
that was made before the ALJ (Sentence Four r eview). 
However, when the claimant seeks to r ely on evidence that 
was not before the ALJ, the district court may remand to 
the Commissioner but only if the evidence is new and 
material and if there was good cause why it was not 
previously presented to the ALJ (Sentence Six review). See 
Keeton v. DHHS, 21 F.3d 1064, 1067 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
Other courts of appeals agree with our analysis of the 
appropriate treatment on judicial r eview of evidence that 
was not presented to the ALJ. The fullest discussion of this 
issue appears in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Eads, 
where the court explained that although evidence 
considered by the Appeals Council is part of the 
administrative record on appeal, it cannot be considered by 
the District Court in making its substantial evidence review 
once the Appeals Council has denied review. As the Eads 
court stated, 
 
       It might seem . . . that the district judge and we would 
       be free to consider the new evidence that was before 
       the Appeals Council in deciding whether the decision 
       denying benefits was supported by the recor d as a 
       whole. And of course this is right when the Council has 
       accepted the case for review and made a decision on 
       the merits, based on all the evidence before it, which 
       then becomes the decision reviewed in the courts. It is 
       wrong when the Council has refused to r eview the 
       case. For then the decision reviewed in the courts is 
       the decision of the administrative law judge. The 
       correctness of that decision depends on the evidence 
       that was before him. He cannot be faulted for having 
       failed to weigh evidence never presented to him. . . . 
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Eads, 983 F.2d at 817 (citations omitted). 
 
The Eads decision was followed by the Eleventh Circuit's 
decision in Falge, 150 F.3d at 1323 ("when the [Appeals 
Council] has denied review, we will look only to the 
evidence actually presented to the ALJ in deter mining 
whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial 
evidence."). It was also followed by the Sixth Circuit in 
Cotton, 2 F.3d at 692, a case that was in a different posture 
than the usual appeal by a claimant from the affirmance of 
the denial of disability benefits. Cotton was an appeal by 
the Secretary from the district court's r eversal of the denial 
of benefits and direction that Cotton be awar ded benefits. 
The district court had based its judgment on new evidence 
that Cotton had presented to the Appeals Council, which 
denied review. In reversing the district court, the Sixth 
Circuit, following Eads, concluded"that the district court 
improperly considered Cotton's new evidence because the 
claimant failed to demonstrate good cause justifying a 
remand for administrative consideration of the new 
evidence." Cotton, 2 F.3d at 696. 
 
We are not persuaded by the courts of appeals that hold 
to the contrary. Thus, for example, the Second Cir cuit in 
Perez held that evidence first pr esented to the Appeals 
Council is part of the administrative recor d to be 
considered by the district court on judicial r eview even 
though the Appeals Council denied review. 77 F .3d at 45. 
The decision in Perez and that on which it relies, the Tenth 
Circuit's decision in O'Dell, ar e based on the regulation that 
requires the Appeals Council to "evaluate the entire record 
including the new and material evidence submitted" in 
determining whether to review the case. 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.970(b). These decisions opine that the purpose of this 
regulation would be undermined if the new evidence 
submitted to the Appeals Council was ignored by the 
district court. See, e.g., Perez , 77 F.3d at 45. 
 
We believe the purpose of that regulation is to give the 
claimant an opportunity to present additional evidence, if it 
is new and material, for consideration by the Appeals 
Council in deciding whether to grant review of the ALJ's 
decision. This is consistent with the policy of giving the 
claimant ample opportunity to prove his or her disability. 
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Counsel for the Social Security Administration advised us 
at oral argument that the Appeals Council grants review 
and remands approximately 25% of its cases to the ALJ, 
thereby using the new and material evidence on claimants' 
behalf. 
 
However, it is the Social Security Act and not the 
regulations that governs the standar ds for judicial review. 
We have previously held that evidence that was not before 
the ALJ cannot be used to argue that the ALJ's decision 
was not supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. 
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir . 1991) (citing United 
States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963)). No 
statutory authority (the source of the district court's review) 
authorizes the court to review the Appeals Council decision 
to deny review. No statutory provision authorizes the 
district court to make a decision on the substantial 
evidence standard based on the new and material evidence 
never presented to the ALJ. Instead, the Act gives the 
district court authority to remand the case to the 
Commissioner, but only if the claimant has shown good 
cause why such new and material evidence was not 
presented to the ALJ. 
 
To construe the statute otherwise, as Matthews would do, 
would be to set up a conflict between the r egulations and 
the statute on whether good cause need be shown. 
Matthews seeks to support her position by noting that there 
is no requirement in the regulations that the claimant must 
show good cause to the Appeals Council befor e it can 
consider the new and material evidence. However , the 
regulation only concerns the recor d for purposes of 
administrative decisionmaking, i.e., what the Appeals 
Council may consider. For purposes of judicial review, the 
"record" is "the evidence upon which the findings and 
decision complained of are based." 42 U.S.C.S 405(g) 
(Sentence Three). That is the information that was before 
the ALJ, the final administrative decisionmaker when the 
Appeals Council denies review. The new and material 
evidence is transmitted with the record so that the district 
court will have before it the evidence that will be the 
subject of the remand if the claimant can show good cause 
why such new and material evidence was not submitted to 
the ALJ. 
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Our holding is consistent with this court's prior opinions. 
In Szubak, the claimant argued that she was entitled to a 
remand for further consideration in light offive medical 
reports compiled after the Secretary's determination that 
claimant submitted for the first time to the district court. 
We held that a claimant must satisfy all thr ee requirements 
of Sentence Six (new, material and good cause) in or der to 
justify a remand. See Szubak, 745 F .2d at 833. Szubak was 
entitled to a remand because she had shown good cause.3 
Significantly, we did not direct the district court to consider 
the effect of the new evidence on the substantiality of the 
evidence previously presented to the ALJ. Instead, we 
directed remand for such a determination to be made by 
the forum which is entrusted by the statutory scheme for 
determining disability vel non. In our subsequent opinion in 
Jones, we made this explicit when we stated that evidence 
not presented to the ALJ "cannot be used to argue the 
ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence." 
954 F.2d at 128 (quotation omitted). 
 
Our holding is also in accord with sound public policy. 
We should encourage disability claimants to present to the 
ALJ all relevant evidence concerning the claimant's 
impairments. If we were to order r emand for each item of 
new and material evidence, we would open the door for 
claimants to withhold evidence from the ALJ in order to 
preserve a reason for remand. See Szubak, 745 F.2d at 834 
("A claimant might be tempted to withhold medical reports, 
or refrain from introducing all r elevant evidence, with the 
idea of obtaining another bite of the apple if the Secretary 
decides that the claimant is not disabled.") (quotation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Both parties refer to our subsequent decision in Frankenfield v. 
Bowen, 861 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1988), a decision that adds little to the 
issue under consideration here. There, we remanded the case to the 
Secretary because the ALJ's decision rejecting disability was not 
supported by the medical evidence. We held it was impermissible for the 
ALJ to ignore without explanation the physician's reports and instead 
base the decision solely on the ALJ's "observation of the claimant at the 
hearing." Id. at 408. In the course of our opinion, we referred to a 
subsequent supporting physician's report pr esented to the Appeals 
Council and we cited Szubak but we did not discuss the good cause 
requirement. 
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omitted); Wilkins, 953 F.2d at 97 (Chapman, J., dissenting) 
("By allowing the proceedings to be r eopened and remanded 
for additional evidence, . . . the majority is encouraging 
attorneys to hold back evidence and then seek remand for 
consideration of evidence that was available at the time of 
the ALJ hearing."). Instead, we believe that it is a much 
sounder policy to require claimants to pr esent all material 
evidence to the ALJ and prohibit judicial r eview of new 
evidence unless there is good reason for not having brought 
it before the ALJ. Such a holding is instrumental to the 




The procedure followed by the District Court in this case 
was consistent with the framework outlined above. The 
Magistrate Judge declined to review or r emand for 
consideration of the additional evidence that Matthews had 
submitted to the Appeals Council because the Magistrate 
Judge concluded that Matthews had failed to show good 
cause for not presenting the evidence to the ALJ. Although 
the Magistrate Judge believed that the evaluation pr epared 
by Baine was new and material evidence, an issue not 
reached by the District Court, the Magistrate Judge noted 
that Matthews had not explained why she did not attempt 
to obtain Baine's evaluation at a time when it could be 
considered by the ALJ. The District Court agr eed that the 
claimant had the burden of showing good cause and failed 
to satisfy it, thereby adopting the Magistrate Judge's report.4 
 
Matthews argues that she did not realize the importance 
of obtaining a vocational evaluation of her arithmetic skills 
early in the proceedings. But Matthews should have known 
that her ability to work was an issue at the ALJ hearing 
that was held after remand by the Appeals Council. Indeed, 
a vocational expert had testified on July 11, 1996 (at the 
second ALJ hearing) that Matthews could perfor m cashier 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Matthews argues in passing that once the Appeals Council reviewed 
the evidence, it was introduced into the r ecord in a prior proceeding and 
she has automatically satisfied the good cause r equirement. There is no 
precedent to support such an interpretation of the statutory language 
and we reject it as implausible. 
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and similar types of jobs. Tr. at 169-79. By then, it should 
have been clear to Matthews that her arithmetic and 
reading skills were relevant. The ALJ even kept the 
administrative record open in order to allow Matthews to 
submit additional evidence. Yet Matthews did not submit 
Baine's report until more than eight months after the ALJ's 
adverse decision. Therefore, we agr ee with the District 
Court that Matthews has not shown any good cause why 
she did not obtain this evidence for the ALJ pr oceeding. 
 
In the case before us, the Magistrate Judge r eviewed the 
evidence that was before the ALJ and deter mined that there 
was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's 
decision based on the record befor e it. The District Court 
agreed. Matthews has not put into issue the substantiality 
of the evidence before the ALJ,5 and we have no basis to 
disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the ALJ's 





For the reasons set forth, we will affir m the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment for the 
Commissioner. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We will not consider the substantiality of the evidence before the ALJ, 
although Matthews, at the conclusion of her brief, r equests that we 
reverse the decision of the District Court with directions to award her 
the disability benefits she was denied. Our rules make clear that an 
appellant is limited to the issues listed in the statement of issues, see 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5); L.A.R. 28(1)(a), and this issue is not so 
included. 
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